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Abstract
The notion of bisimulation is an important concept in process algebra and modern modal logic. This paper explores the notion of
B-similarity, which is a kind of bisimulation between preferential models. We characterize the equivalence of preferential models
in terms of B-similarity. However, this result is applicable only for preferential models of ﬁnite depth. To overcome this defect,
we introduce a weak notion of similarity called M-similarity, and obtain a result corresponding to Hennessy–Milner Theorem and
Keisler–Shelah’s Isomorphism Theorem in modal logic and ﬁrst-order logic, respectively. As its application, we investigate the
expressive power of Boolean combinations of conditional assertions (BCA, for short), and prove that BCAs are the fragments of
ﬁrst-order language preserved under M-similarity. Moreover, we obtain a characterization for elementary classes deﬁned by BCAs.A
notion of ﬁrst-order translation originating from modal logic plays an important role in this paper. In order to illustrate that ﬁrst-order
translation is a powerful tool in the study of nonmonotonic logic, some model-theoretic results about preferential models are proved
based on this translation.
© 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The notion of bisimulation is a familiar concept in modal logic and process algebra, which supplies us with powerful
tools for investigating properties of Labeled Transition System (LTS, for short) [2,14,13,16]. Roughly speaking, a
bisimulation is a relation between two LTSs in which related states have identical atomic information and matching
transition possibilities. It is well known that bisimulation provides a method to characterize modal equivalence, more
formally, the following theorem is fundamental in modal logic [2]:
Let  be a modal similarity type, and let M1 and M2 be -models, and w1 and w2 two states in M1 and M2,
respectively. Then, w1 and w2 satisfy the same modal formulas (i.e., w1 and w2 are modally equivalent) if and only if
there exists a bisimulation between ultraﬁlter extensions of M1 and M2 which links principal ultraﬁlters generated by
w1 and w2, respectively.
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When we consider only image-ﬁnite Kripke models [2], there is a more succinct result so-called Hennessy–Milner
Theorem which states that modal equivalence is coincident with bisimulation for image-ﬁnite models. These theorems
play a similar role as Keisler–Shelah’s Isomorphism Theorem in ﬁrst-order logic [7], which asserts that two ﬁrst-order
models are elementarily equivalent if and only if they have isomorphic ultrapowers.
Recently, in the ﬁeld of belief change and nonmonotonic logic, a notion of similarity has been introduced byBochman
[5], which is a kind of bisimulation for structures that consist of some theories endowed with a preferential relation.
These structures are called epistemic states and regarded as a generalization of common representations suggested for
belief change [3–5]. The notion of similarity plays an important role in exploring properties of epistemic states that
determine their behavior in nonmonotonic reasoning and belief change, technical detail may be found in [5].
This paper will concern with the notion of similarity for preferential models. Two preferential models are said to
be equivalent if they generate the same preferential relation. Then, an interesting theoretical problem is raised: is it
possible to establish a result about equivalence and similarity for preferential models, which corresponds to the results
of modal and ﬁrst-order logic mentioned in the above? In other words, is it possible to provide a characterization for
the equivalence of two preferential models in terms of similarity? This paper will give a positive answer.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 recalls some related deﬁnitions and results from nonmonotonic
logic and ﬁrst-order model theory. In Section 3, a notion of ﬁrst-order translation is introduced and explored, which is
a bridge between preferential relations and ﬁrst-order logic. Based on this notion, we can import results and techniques
from ﬁrst-order logic to nonmonotonic logic. Sections 4 and 5 concern with the link between the equivalence and
similarity of preferential models. Section 6 shows some model-theoretic properties of preferential models through
ﬁrst-order translation.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, some related deﬁnitions and results that have appeared in the literature will be recalled.
2.1. Preferential inference relations and models
We consider formulae of classical propositional calculus built over a set of atomic formulae denoted  plus two
constants  and ⊥ (the formulae true and false, respectively). The set of all well formed formulae in  will be denoted
by Form(). A valuation is a function v:  ∪ {,⊥} → {0, 1} such that v() = 1 and v(⊥) = 0. We use lower case
letters of the Greek alphabet to denote formulae, the letters v, n,m, v1, v2, etc. to denote valuations, and Val() to
denote the set of all valuations for . For any valuation v, we denote the set { : v   and  ∈ Form()} by Th(v).
The notation  means that the formula  is a tautology and v   means that the valuation v satisﬁes  where
compound formulae are evaluated as usual. If  is a set of valuations, then   means that v   for any valuation
v ∈ . For any  ⊆ Form(), we denote the set {v ∈ Val() : v   for any  ∈ } by mod().
A nonmonotonic inference relation is a binary relation over formulae which satisﬁes some Horn or non-Horn
conditions deﬁned in the style of Gentzen. Following Gabbay [9], this paper uses the relation symbol |∼ to denote
nonmonotonic consequence to distinguish it from monotonic logical consequence. If both  and  are formulae, then
the sequence |∼ is called a conditional assertion.
Let S be a set and ≺ a strict partial order over S. For any V ⊆ S, V is said to be smooth if for any t ∈ V , either t is
itself minimal in V , i.e., there is no w ∈ V such that w ≺ t , or there exists s ∈ V such that s ≺ t and s is minimal in
V . The set of all minimal elements of V with respect to ≺ will be denoted by min(V ).
Following the deﬁnition in [10], a preferential model W for a language  is a triple 〈S, l,≺〉, where S is a nonempty
set, the elements of which are called states, the interpretation function l : S → Val() assigns a valuation to each
state, and ≺ is a strict partial order on S satisfying the following smoothness condition: for any formula , the set
‖‖W =def {s : s ∈ S and l(s)| = } is smooth. If there is no ambiguity, we shall write ‖‖ for ‖‖W . A model W
is said to be injective if the function l is injective. For any X ⊆ S, we denote the set {v ∈ Val() : ∃s(s ∈ X and
l(s) = v)} by l(X).
Let W be a preferential model for . The inference relation |∼W generated by W is deﬁned as follows: |∼W is a
binary relation over Form() such that, for any formulae  and ,  |∼W iff for any s minimal in ‖‖, l(s) . We
denote the set { : |∼W} by CW().
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For any preferential models W1 and W2 for the same language, if |∼W1 = |∼W2 then W1 will be said to be equivalent
to W2 and denoted by W1 ≡ W2.
2.2. First-order models and ultraproducts
A ﬁrst-order language consists of three kinds of symbols: relation symbols, function symbols and constant symbols.
Since this paper concerns only ﬁrst-order languages without function symbols, we assume that  does not contain
function symbols when we recall some related concepts and results from ﬁrst-order model theory. More general
deﬁnitions may be found in [7]. This paper denotes relation symbols and constant symbols by capital Latin letters P
and lower case Latin letters c with subscripts, respectively. Each relation symbol P of  is associated with a natural
number n1, which means P is an n-placed relation. A language ′ is said to be a simple expansion of  if  ⊆ ′
and all symbols in ′ but not in  are constant symbols. In this case, ′ may be written as ′ =  ∪ X, where X is the
set of new constant symbols.
A model  for  is a pair 〈A, 〉, where, A is the domain of  which is a nonempty set, and  is an interpretation
function such that, for any n-placed relation symbol P in , (P ) is an n-placed relation over A, and for any constant
symbol c, (c) ∈ A. As usual, we denote (P ) (resp. (c)) by P  (resp. c). A model 1 = 〈A1, 1〉 is said to be a
submodel of 2 = 〈A2, 2〉 if A1 ⊆ A2, 1(c) = 2(c) for each constant symbol c in  and, for each relation symbol
P in , 1(P ) is the restriction of 2(P ) to A1.
Let a1, a2, . . . , an be a sequence in A and (x1 . . . xn) a ﬁrst-order formula whose free variables are among x1,
x2, . . . , xn. The notation  [a1 . . . an]means that formula (x1 · · · xn) is satisﬁed in themodel  under the assignment
[a1 . . . an], whose formal deﬁnition may be found in [7]. The theory of , in symbols Th(), is the set of all sentences
(i.e., formulas without free variables) which are true in . Two ﬁrst-order models are said to be elementarily equivalent
if they have the same theory. Let (x1 . . . xn) be a set of ﬁrst-order formulas and every formula  in (x1 . . . xn)
contains at most the variables x1, x2, . . . , xn free, [a1 . . . an] means that  [a1 . . . an] for each (x1 . . . xn)
in (x1 . . . xn). The set (x1 . . . xn) is said to be realized in  if, for some sequence a1, a2, . . . , an ∈ A, we have
[a1 . . . an]. Otherwise, we say that  omits (x1 . . . xn).
Let I be a nonempty set and D an ultraﬁlter over I. Suppose i is a model for each i ∈ I . The Cartesian product
of Ai (i ∈ I ) (notation: 	i∈I Ai) is the set of all functions f with domain I such that f (i) ∈ Ai for each i ∈ I .
For any two functions f, g ∈ 	i∈I Ai , f and g are said to be D-equivalent, in symbols f =D g, if and only if
{i ∈ I : f (i) = g(i)} ∈ D. We use fD to denote the equivalence class {g ∈ 	i∈I Ai : f =D g}. As usual, we use
	D i to denote the ultraproduct of {i}i∈I modulo D. The formal deﬁnition of the ultraproduct may be found in [7].
In the case when all the models i are the same, say i = , the ultraproduct may be written 	D , and is called the
ultrapower of  modulo D.
The following result is the ‘fundamental theorem’ of ultraproducts, which is an important and basic theorem in
ﬁrst-order model theory.
Theorem 2.1. Let I be a nonempty set, and let D be an ultraﬁlter over I and i be a model for ﬁrst-order language 
for each i ∈ I . Then
(1) Given any formula (x1, x2, . . . , xn) of  and f 1D . . . f nD ∈ 	D Ai , we have
	
D
i  [f 1D . . . f nD] if and only if {i ∈ I : i  [f 1(i) . . . f n(i)]} ∈ D.
(2) For any sentence  of ,
	
D
i   if and only if {i ∈ I : i  } ∈ D.
Proof. See Theorem 4.1.9 in [7]. 
For any two models 1 and 2 for the same language, 1 is an elementary submodel of 2 iff 1 is a submodel
of 2 and for all formulas (x1 . . . xn) and all elements a1 . . . an in 1, we have 1  [a1 . . . an] iff 2  [a1 . . . an].
An elementary embedding of 1 into 2 is an isomorphism f of 1 onto an elementary submodel of 2, denoted by
f : 1  2. Let I be a nonempty set, D an ultraﬁlter over I and  a model. The natural embedding d of  into 	D 
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is the function d such that, for any a ∈ A, d(a) is the equivalence class of the constant function with value a, i.e.,
d(a) = fD , where f (i) = a for each i ∈ I . It is well known that d :   	D .
3. First-order translation
In order to explore the relationship betweenmodal logic andﬁrst-order logic,modal logicians introduced a technology
called standard translation [2], which provides an avenue to use results and techniques from ﬁrst-order model theory
and plays an important role in establishing the correspondence theory in modal logic [2]. This paper borrows this
technology and introduces a similar translation for preferential inferences.
We ﬁrst deﬁne our correspondence languages—that is, the languages we will translate conditional assertions into.
For  a proposition language, let  be the ﬁrst-order language with equality which consists of unary relation symbols
P0, P1, . . . corresponding to the proposition letters p0, p1, . . . in , and an binary relation symbol R.
Deﬁnition 3.1. Let x be a ﬁrst-order variable. The translation function Trx(·) taking propositional formulas in  to
ﬁrst-order formulas in  is deﬁned as follows:
(1) Trx(p) =def P(x) for any p ∈ ,
(2) Trx(¬) =def ¬Trx(),
(3) Trx( ∨ 
) =def Trx()∨ Trx(
), and
(4) Trx() =def x = x.
Clearly, for any preferential model M for , since M provides an interpretation for each symbol in , it can act as a
ﬁrst-order model for the language . Formally, we have the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 3.2. Given a preferential model M = 〈S, l,≺〉 for a language , the model M = 〈S,RM , P M 〉p∈ for
the ﬁrst-order language  is deﬁned as follows:
(1) RM =def ≺.
(2) P M =def ‖p‖M = {s ∈ S : l(s)p} for any p ∈ .
Lemma 3.1. Let M = 〈S, l,≺〉 be a preferential model for a language . For any formula  and s ∈ S, we have
(1) l(s)  iff M  Trx()[s].
(2) ‖‖ = ‖‖ iff M  ∀x(Trx() ↔ Trx()).
(3) s ∈ min(‖‖) iff M min(, x)[s], where
min(, x) =def Trx() ∧ ∀z(Trz() → ¬R(z, x)).
Proof. (1) By induction on the complexity of ; (2) Immediately follows from (1); (3) Straightforward. 
Thus, for any formula  in  and preferential model M, the ﬁrst-order formula Trx() simulates  in ﬁrst-order model
M . Moreover, the smoothness of the set ‖‖ can be depicted as M  smooth(), where
smooth() =def ∀x(Trx() ∧ ∃y(Try() ∧ R(y, x)) → ∃y(min(, y) ∧ R(y, x))).
More formally, we have
Lemma 3.2. For any formulaof propositional language andﬁrst-ordermodel for.The following are equivalent:
(1) The set {s: Trx()[s]} is smooth with respect to R.
(2)  smooth().
Proof. Straightforward. 
We now turn to another translation function (·)◦, which translates conditional assertions into ﬁrst-order sentences.
In fact, translating conditional assertions into other languages has appeared in the literature, for instance, Boutilier
presents a method for translating them into modal formulas [6].
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Deﬁnition 3.3. The translation function (·)◦ taking conditional assertions in  to ﬁrst-order sentences in  is deﬁned
as follows:
(|∼)◦ =def ∀x((Trx() ∧ ¬∃y(Try() ∧ R(y, x))) → Trx()).
Given a preferential relation |∼ in , we deﬁne |∼◦ as
|∼◦ =def {(|∼)◦ : |∼ and ,  ∈ Form()} ∪ {¬(|∼)◦ : | /∼ and ,  ∈ Form()}.
Clearly, |∼◦ is a set of ﬁrst-order sentences of .
Lemma 3.3. Let M = 〈S, l,≺〉 be a preferential model. For any formula  and , the following are equivalent:
(1) |∼M.
(2) M  (|∼)◦.
Proof. (1)⇒(2) Assume that s is any state such that
M Trx() ∧ ¬∃y(Try() ∧ R(y, x))[s].
To complete the proof, it is enough to show M  Trx()[s]. By the assumption and (3) from Lemma 3.1, we have
s ∈ min(‖‖). So, l(s)  comes from |∼M. Further, by (1) from Lemma 3.1, we obtain M Trx()[s], as desired.
(2)⇒ (1) Let s ∈ min(‖‖). It is enough to show l(s) . Clearly, by (3) from Lemma 3.1, M Trx() ∧
¬∃y(Try() ∧ R(y, x))[s] immediately follows from s ∈ min(‖‖). Since M  (|∼)◦, i.e.,
M ∀x((Trx() ∧ ¬∃y(Try() ∧ R(y, x))) → Trx()),
we get M Trx()[s]. So, l(s) . 
As an immediate consequence of the above lemma, we obtain
Corollary 3.4. For any preferential relation |∼ and preferential model M, |∼ can be generated by M (i.e., |∼ = |∼M )
if and only if M  |∼◦.
We know that, for any preferential model M for , M is a ﬁrst-order model for . In reverse, given a model  for
 such that:
(1) ∀x¬R(x, x),
(2) ∀x∀y∀z(R(x, y) ∧ R(y, z) → R(x, z)), and
(3)  smooth(), for any  ∈ Form().
then  induces a preferential model M = 〈S, l,≺〉 for  described as follows:
(4) S is the domain of .
(5) For any s ∈ S, l(s) = {p ∈  : s ∈ P }. 1
(6) ≺= R.
Thus, given a preferential model W , since W satisﬁes the conditions (1), (2) and (3), by Theorem 2.1, so does the
ultrapower	D W for any ultraﬁlter D. Hence,	D W can induce a preferential model M	D W in the above manner.
Convention: In the following, for convenience, we denote the preferential model M	D W by 	D W . On the other
hand, we also denote the ultrapower	D W by	D W when we can understand the meaning of	D W from its context.
Theorem 3.5. For any preferential model W and ultraﬁlter D, we have
(1) 	D W is a preferential model.
(2) |∼W = |∼	D W .
(3) d : W  	D W , where d is natural embedding.
1 In this paper, we give the valuation as for a Herbrand model, that is identifying the subset of variables with its characteristic function.
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Proof. (1) SinceW  {∀x¬R(x,x),∀x∀y∀z(R(x,y)∧R(y, z) → R(x, z))} and, for any ∈ Form(),W  smooth(),
by Theorem 2.1, so does 	D W . Thus, 	D W is a preferential model.
(2) Since W  (|∼W)◦, by Theorem 2.1, 	D W  (|∼W)◦. By Corollary 3.4, |∼W = |∼	D W .
(3) See Corollary 4.1.13 in [7]. 
Clearly, without the above convention, the notation	D W in the conclusions (1) and (2) (resp., (3)) should be written
as M	D W (resp., 	D W ).
4. B-similarity between preferential models
This section will introduce and explore a notion of similarity, which may be regarded as the ‘preferential model’
version of the notion of similarity for epistemic states introduced by Bochman in [5]. Thus, we will preﬁx the name of
similarity with a ‘B’ for ‘Bochman’.
Deﬁnition 4.1. Let M1 = 〈S1, l1,≺1〉 and M2 = 〈S2, l2,≺2〉 be two preferential models, and T1, T2 subsets of S1, S2,
respectively. We will say that T1 dominates T2 (notation: T1>T2) if ∀s ∈ T2∃t ∈ T1(l1(t) = l2(s)).
Deﬁnition 4.2. Let M1 = 〈S1, l1,≺1〉 and M2 = 〈S2, l2,≺2〉 be two preferential models for the same language. M1
will be said to be semi-B-similar to M2 (notation: M1→BM2) if
∀s2 ∈ S2∃s1 ∈ S1(l1(s1) = l2(s2) ∧ s2⇓M2>s1⇓M1 ),
where si⇓Mi = {t : t ≺i si} for i = 1, 2.
Clearly, M1 →B M2 iff, for any s2 ∈ S2, there exists a state s1 ∈ S1 such that
(1) l1(s1) = l2(s2).
(2) ∀t1 ∈ S1(t1 ≺1 s1 ⇒ ∃t2 ∈ S2(t2 ≺2 s2 ∧ l1(t1) = l2(t2))).
Lemma 4.1. Let M1 = 〈S1, l1,≺1〉 and M2 = 〈S2, l2,≺2〉 be two preferential models for a language . Then
M2→BM1 implies |∼M2 ⊆ |∼M1 .
Proof. It is enough to show that
l1(min(‖‖M1)) ⊆ l2(min(‖‖M2)) for any formula .
Let  be any formula and m ∈ l1(min(‖‖M1)). Thus, l1(s1) = m for some state s1 ∈ min(‖‖M1). Since M2 →B
M1, there exists a state s2 ∈ S2 such that
(1) l1(s1) = l2(s2) = m, and
(2) ∀t2 ∈ S2(t2 ≺2 s2 ⇒ ∃t1 ∈ S1(t1 ≺1 s1 ∧ l1(t1) = l2(t2))).
We will show that s2 ∈ min(‖‖M2). Suppose not. Since l2(s2) , by the smoothness of ‖‖M2 , there exists a
state t2 ∈ S2 such that t2 ≺2 s2 and t2 ∈ min(‖‖M2). So, by (2), there exists a state t1 ∈ S1 such that t1 ≺1 s1 and
l1(t1) = l2(t2), which contradicts s1 ∈ min(‖‖M1). Hence, s2 ∈ min(‖‖M2), so, m ∈ l2(min(‖‖M2)). 
Deﬁnition 4.3. Let M1 and M2 be two preferential models for the same language. M1 and M2 will be said to be
B-similar, in symbols M1 ↔B M2, if M1→BM2 and M2→BM1.
It is easy to see that the relation ↔B is indeed an equivalence relation.
Theorem 4.2. Let M1 and M2 be two preferential models for the same language. Then M1↔BM2 implies M1 ≡ M2.
Proof. Immediately follows from Lemma 4.1 and Deﬁnition 4.3. 
Now for a fundamental question: is the converse of the above theorem true? That is, whether the equivalence of two
preferential models implies that they are B-similar? The answer is no because of the following two counterexamples.
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Fig. 1. Preferential model W1 and W2.
Example 4.1. Let  be an inﬁnite language, and let m and n be valuations such that m = n. Consider the following
two injective models: W1 = 〈U −{n}, id1,∅〉 and W2 = 〈U −{m}, id2,∅〉, where id1 and id2 are the identity functions
over U −{n} and U −{m}, respectively, and U is the set of all valuations. By the inﬁniteness of the language, it is easy
to see that
| /∼W1 iff | /∼W2, for any pair of formulas  and .
So,W1 ≡ W2. On the other hand, since n /∈ U −{n} and n ∈ U −{m}, we haveW1BW2, so,W1 ↔BW2. Similarly,
W2BW1. 
Example 4.2. Let  be an inﬁnite language. Consider two injective ranked models W1 and W2 in Fig. 1, where n is a
valuation and U is the set of all valuations.
By the inﬁniteness of the language, we get W1 ≡ W2 trivially, however, we have W1B W2 and W1 ↔B W2. But,
W2→B W1 holds, in fact, W2→BW for any preferential model W for . 
Nonetheless, it is possible to show a restricted converse to Theorem 4.2. To this end, let’s ﬁrstly recall a basic concept
from ﬁrst-order model theory which will play an important role in the following work.
Let  be a model for ﬁrst-order language  and X ⊆ A, where A is the domain of . The expansion (, a)a∈X is a
model for  ∪ {ca : a ∈ X} which has the same interpretations for old symbols as , and interprets ca by a itself for
each a ∈ X. Let (x) be a set of formulas of . (x) is said to be consistent with the theory of  if the set (x)∪Th()
can be realized. Consequently, by the compactness, (x) is consistent with Th() if and only if every ﬁnite subset of
(x) is realized in some model of Th(). 2
Deﬁnition 4.4. Let  be a cardinal. A model  for ﬁrst-order language  is said to be -saturated iff for every subset
X ⊆ A (the domain of ) of power |X| < , the expansion (, a)a∈X realizes every set (x) of the language
 ∪ {ca : a ∈ X} which is consistent with the theory of (, a)a∈X.
It is easy to see that, if  is -saturated then it is -saturated for any cardinal  < . For convenience, we recall a
notion introduced in [18] as follows.
Deﬁnition 4.5. Let M = 〈S, l,≺〉 be a preferential model for a language . M is said to be P-saturated if, for any
formula ,
l(min(‖‖)) = {m : m ∈ Val() such that mCM()}.
Proposition 4.3. For any ﬁnite preferential model M for a language , M is 0-saturated.
Proof. Let X be a ﬁnite subset of SM and (x) a set of formulas of  ∪ {ca : a ∈ X}. Suppose that (x) is consistent
with the theory of (M , a)a∈X. Hence, (x)∪ Th((M, a)a∈X) can be realized in some model 0. Thus, (M , a)a∈X is
2 Refer to Proposition 2.2.7 in [7].
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elementarily equivalent to 0. Further, since (M , a)a∈X is ﬁnite, (M , a)a∈X is isomorphism to 0. 3 Consequently,
the expansion (M , a)a∈X realizes (x). So, M is 0-saturated. 
Deﬁnition 4.6. Let m be a valuation for . The following set will be called the diagram of m and denoted by m(x).
m(x) =def {P(x) : p ∈  and mp} ∪ {¬P(x) : p ∈  and m / p}.
Clearly, for any preferential model M and s ∈ SM , we have
M m[s] if and only if lM(s) = m.
Lemma 4.4. Let M be a preferential model for a language  and M be 0-saturated. Then M is P-saturated.
Proof. It is enough to show that, for any formula , we have
l(min(‖‖)) = {m : m ∈ Val() and mCM()}.
Since the claim is trivial when ‖‖ is empty, we assume it is nonempty. Let m ∈ Val() such that mCM(). We set
m(x) = m(x) ∪ {Trx() ∧ ¬∃y(Try() ∧ R(y, x))}.
Now we demonstrate the following claims.
Claim 1. Let 0(x) be any nonempty ﬁnite subset of m(x). Then, there exists an element v ∈ SM such that:
(1) M 0[v].
(2) M Trx() ∧ ¬∃y(Try() ∧ R(y, x))[v].
If 0(x) ∩ m(x) = ∅ then the sentence Trx() ∧ ¬∃y(Try() ∧ R(y, x)) is the only element in 0(x). Since ‖‖
= ∅, by the smoothness, min(‖‖) = ∅. Clearly, for any v ∈ min(‖‖), we have
M Trx() ∧ ¬∃y(Try() ∧ R(y, x))[v].
Next, we consider another case in which 0(x) ∩ m(x) = ∅. We put
−0 (x) = 0(x) − {Trx() ∧ ¬∃y(Try() ∧ R(y, x))}.
Clearly, −0 (x) ⊆ m(x). Suppose that M / −0 (x)[v] for any v such that
M Trx() ∧ ¬∃y(Try() ∧ R(y, x))[v].
Thus, we have
M ∀x(Trx() ∧ ¬∃y(Try() ∧ R(y, x)) → ¬Trx()), where
 =
( ∧
P(x)∈−0 (x)
p
)∧( ∧
¬P(x)∈−0 (x)
¬p
)
.
So, M  (|∼¬)◦. Further, by Lemma 3.3, we get ¬ ∈ CM(), which contradicts mCM() and m . Hence,
there exist some states in SM satisfying the conditions (1) and (2).
Claim 2. m ∈ l(min(‖‖)).
By Claim 1, since M is 0-saturated, there exists an element v ∈ SM such that M m[v]. So, M Trx() ∧
¬∃y(Try() ∧ R(y, x))[v], further, by (3) from Lemma 3.1, we have v ∈ min(‖‖). Moreover, since M m[v],
l(v) = m. Hence, m ∈ l(min(‖‖)), as desired.
3 Refer to Proposition 1.3.19 in [7].
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Now we return to the proof of the lemma. By Claim 2, we get
l(min(‖‖)) ⊇ {m : m ∈ Val() and mCM()}.
On the other hand, the opposite inclusion can be proved trivially. So, the proof is complete. 
Consequently, by Proposition 4.3 and Lemma 4.4, all ﬁnite preferential models are P-saturated.
Lemma 4.5. Let M = 〈S, l,≺〉 be a preferential model for a language  and M be 0-saturated, and let m ∈ Val()
and  be a nonempty set of formulas of . Then M satisﬁes the following condition (4.1):
If m ∈ l(min(‖∨0‖)) for any nonempty ﬁnite subset 0 of  then there exists s ∈ S such that
l(s) = m and s ∈ ⋂
∈
min (‖‖). (4.1)
Proof. Let m be any valuation such that m ∈ l(min(‖∨0‖)) for any nonempty ﬁnite subset 0 of . We put
(x) = m(x) ∪ {Trx() ∧ ∀y(Try() → ¬R(y, x)) :  ∈ }.
Clearly, it sufﬁces to prove that (x) is realized in M . Further, since M is 0-saturated, we only need to show that
any ﬁnite subset of (x) is realized in M .
Let 0(x) be any ﬁnite subset of (x). If 0(x) ⊆ m(x), then 0(x) is realized by any t ∈ S such that l(t) = m.
Since  = ∅ and m ∈ l(min(‖∨0‖)) for any nonempty ﬁnite subset 0 of , such states must exist. Next, we
consider another case in which
0(x) ∩ {Trx() ∧ ∀y(Try() → ¬R(y, x)) :  ∈ } = ∅.
We set
0 = { ∈  : Trx() ∧ ∀y(Try() → ¬R(y, x)) ∈ 0(x)}.
Clearly, 0 is a ﬁnite subset of . So, m ∈ l(min(‖∨0‖)), hence, there exists a state s ∈ S such that l(s) = m and
s ∈ min(‖∨0‖). Consequently, by (3) from Lemma 3.1, we have
M Trx
(∨
0
) ∧ ∀y(Try (∨0) → ¬R(y, x))[s]
and
M m[s].
Since Try
(∨
0
) = ∨∈0 Try(), we get
∀y(Try
(∨
0
) → ¬R(y, x)) ∧
∈0
∀y(Try() → ¬R(y, x)).
Hence, we obtain
M  {∀y(Try() → ¬R(y, x)) :  ∈ 0}[s].
On the other hand, for any  ∈ 0 ⊆ , since m ∈ l(min(‖‖)), we have l(s) , i.e., M Trx()[s]. So,
M  {Trx() ∧ ∀y(Try() → ¬R(y, x)) :  ∈ 0}[s]
Further, M 0[s] comes from M m[s]. 
By the way, it is obvious that condition (4.1) in the above lemma is implied by the following condition (4.2):
If (m) = ∅ then there exists s ∈ S such that s ∈ ⋂∈(m) min (‖‖) and l(s) = m, where
(m) = { ∈ Form() : m ∈ l(min(‖‖))}. (4.2)
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We now take up the questions: Does condition (4.1) imply (4.2)? For any preferential model M, does 0-saturation
of M imply (4.2)? Both answers are no because of the proposition as follows:
Proposition 4.6. Let M = 〈S, l,≺〉 be a preferential model for a language . If M is 0-saturated then the following
are equivalent:
(i) M satisﬁes condition (4.2).
(ii) |∼M satisﬁes the following condition WDR:
CM( ∨ ) ⊆ Cn(CM() ∪ CM()), for any formulas  and .
Proof. (i ⇒ ii) Let both  and  be any formula. Assume that, for some formula , we have  ∈ CM( ∨ ) and
 /∈ Cn(CM() ∪ CM()). Hence, there exists a valuation m ∈ Val() such that
mCM() ∪ CM() ∪ {¬}.
So, by Lemma 4.4, ,  ∈ (m). Further, by the condition (i), there exists a state s ∈ S such that l(s) = m and
s ∈ min(‖‖) ∩ min(‖‖). Since
min(‖‖) ∩ min(‖‖) ⊆ min(‖ ∨ ‖),
we get s ∈ min(‖ ∨ ‖), which contradicts l(s)¬ and  ∈ CM( ∨ ).
(ii ⇒ i) Let 0 = {1, . . . , n} be any nonempty ﬁnite subset of (m). Since mCM(i ) for each i ∈ {1 . . . n},
by WDR, we get mCM
(∨
1 in i
)
. Consequently, by Lemma 4.4, there exists a state t ∈ S such that l(t) =
m and t ∈ min (‖∨1 in i‖). Further, by Lemma 4.5, there exists a state s ∈ S such that l(s) = m and
s ∈ ⋂∈(m) min(‖‖). 
The condition WDR is introduced by Freund in order to characterize injective inference relations [8]. In the ﬁnite
framework, Freund obtains a representation theorem for preferential relations satisfying the condition WDR in terms
of injective preferential models as follows:
Let  be a logical ﬁnite language and |∼ a preferential inference relation in . Then, the relation |∼ satisﬁes WDR
if and only if there exists an injective preferential model W such that |∼ = |∼W .
Unfortunately, the above result is false if the language is inﬁnite [15]. In the literature [8], a notion of standard
model is deﬁned, which is a special kind of injective model. An injective preferential model W = 〈S, l,≺〉 is said
to be a standard model if mod(CW ()) = {l(s) : s ∈ min(‖‖)} for any formula . Thus, an injective model is
standard if and only if it is P-saturated. In [18], a notion of a valuation structure is deﬁned, which consists of worlds
ordered by a binary relation introduced in [17]. A canonical approach is also presented, through which we can obtain
an injective preferential model for any preferential relation satisfying WDR. In particular, the following representation
result is established, which provides the semantical characterization for the family of all preferential inference relations
satisfying WDR:
A preferential inference relation |∼ satisﬁes WDR if and only if there exists a standard model W such that
|∼W = |∼.
For any preferential model M, there exists a 0-saturated model M∗ such that M ≡ M∗ (see Theorem 4.11 in this
paper). However, it is false that any preferential model satisﬁes the conditionWDR. In fact,WDR does not always hold
even for injective models [15]. Thus, by Proposition 4.6, the conditions (4.1) and (4.2) are not equivalent.
Remark. From the proofs of Lemmas 4.4, 4.5 and Proposition 4.6, it is easy to see that we only need 1-saturation for
these proofs to go through.
Now, let’s return to our subject matter. In order to show a restricted converse to Theorem 4.2, we need to recall a
notion introduced in [1].A preferential model W is said to be parsimonious iff for every state s ∈ S there is a formula 
such that s ∈ min(‖‖) [1]. Clearly, given a preferential M = 〈S, l,≺〉, the restriction model of M to the set {s : s ∈ S
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and s ∈ min(‖‖) for some formula } is parsimonious. Formally, we have
Proposition 4.7. Let M = 〈S, l,≺〉 be a preferential model. Then the preferential model M∗ is parsimonious, where
M∗ = 〈S∗, l∗,≺∗〉 is deﬁned as follows:
(1) S∗ = {s : s ∈ S and s ∈ min(‖‖) for some formula }.
(2) l∗(s) = l(s) for any s ∈ S∗.
(3) ≺∗=≺ ∩(S∗)2.
Proof. Straightforward. 
The above construction induces a mapping par : M → M∗. Obviously, M ≡ par(M) and, for any formula ,
l(min(‖‖M)) = l∗(min(‖‖par(M))). Moreover, if M is P-saturated then so is par(M).
Lemma 4.8. Let W be a preferential models for a language  and W be 0-saturated, and let s ∈ SW . Suppose that
s /∈ min(‖
‖) for any formula 
. Then, there exists a state t ∈ SW such that t ≺ s and l(t) = l(s).
Proof. We put
(x) = m(x) ∪ {R(x, cs)},
where l(s) = m and cs is a new constant symbol interpreted by s in the model (W , s). To prove this lemma, we need
the following auxiliary result:
Claim. Let 0(x) be any ﬁnite subset of (x). Then, 0(x) ∪ {R(x, cs)} is realized in (W, s).
Suppose not. Since s /∈ min(‖
‖) for any formula 
, we get s /∈ min(‖true‖). So, for some v ∈ SW , we have v ≺ s.
Consequently, (W, s)R(x, cs)[v]. Hence, 0(x) ∩ m(x) = ∅. Let
 =
( ∧
P(x)∈0(x)
p
)
∧
( ∧
¬P(x)∈0(x)
¬p
)
.
Since (W, s) omits 0(x) ∪ {R(x, cs)}, we have
(W, s)∀x(Trx() → ¬R(x, cs)).
Hence, we obtain
W ∀x(Trx() → ¬R(x, z))[s].
On the other hand, W  Trz()[s] comes from l(s) . Therefore, by (3) from Lemma 3.1, we get s ∈ min(‖‖),
which contradicts the assumption that s /∈ min(‖
‖) for any formula 
.
Now we can arrive the conclusion as desired. Since W is 0-saturated, by the above claim, (x) is realized in
(W , s). So, there exists a state t ∈ SW such that t ≺ s and l(t) = l(s). 
In the following, a preferential model 〈S, l,≺〉 is said to be well founded if there are no inﬁnite sequences decreasing
with respect to ≺, that is, no inﬁnite sequences s0, s1, . . . such that s1 ≺ s0, s2 ≺ s1, . . . , si+1 ≺ si, . . ., for i < 0.
Lemma 4.9. Let Wi be a preferential model for a language  and Wi be 0-saturated, for i = 1, 2. If W1 is wellfounded then
|∼W2 ⊆ |∼W1 implies par (W2)→B par(W1).
Proof. For i = 1, 2, we denote par(Wi) = 〈Si, li ,≺i〉 by Mi . Since Wi is 0-saturated, by Lemma 4.4, Mi is
P-saturated. Let s1 ∈ S1 and l1(s1) = m. We now prove that there exists a state s2 ∈ S2 satisfying the following
conditions.
(1) l2(s2) = m.
(2) ∀t2 ∈ S2(t2 ≺2 s2 ⇒ ∃t1 ∈ S1(t1 ≺1 s1 ∧ l1(t1) = l2(t2))).
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Since M1 is parsimonious, there exists a formula  such that s1 ∈ min(‖‖M1). We set
(m) = {s ∈ S2 : s ∈ min(‖‖M2) such that l2(s) = m}.
From CM2() ⊆ CM1() and mCM1(), we have mCM2(). Further, since M2 is P-saturated, it is easy to see
that (m) = ∅. We shall show that there exists a state s2 ∈ (m) satisfying the condition (2). Suppose not. Then, for
any s ∈ (m), there exists a state t ∈ S2 such that
(3) t ≺2 s, and
(4) ∀t1 ∈ S1(t1 ≺1 s1 ⇒ l1(t1) = l2(t)).
Now, for each s ∈ (m), we choose a state ts ∈ S2 satisfying the above conditions (3) and (4). To induce a
contradiction, we need to show the following claims.
Claim 1. There exists a state t1 ∈ S1 such that t1 ≺1 s1.
Suppose not. Then, m ∈ l1(min(‖true‖M1)). Since M2 is P-saturated and |∼W2 ⊆ |∼W1 , there exists a state s ∈ S2
such that
l2(s) = m and s ∈ min(‖true‖M2).
Further, from m , we get s ∈ min(‖‖M2), so, s belongs to (m) and there is no t ∈ S2 such that t ≺2 s, which
contradicts the assumption.
Claim 2. For any s ∈ (m), there exists a formula s such that l2(ts)¬s and, for any t1 ≺1 s1, l1(t1) s .
Let s be any state in (m), and let cs1 be a new constant symbol interpreted by s1 itself in (M1 , s1) and (W1 , s1).
We put
ts (x) = l2(ts )(x) ∪ {R(x, cs1)}.
Clearly, ts (x) is a set of formulas of the ﬁrst-order language  ∪ {cs1}. Since l1(t) = l2(ts) for any t ≺1 s1, the
model (M1 , s1) omits the set ts (x). We now verify that the model (W1 , s1) omits the set ts (x) too.
Assume not. Thus, for some state t1 ∈ SW1 , we have (W1 , s1)ts [t1]. So, t1 ≺W1 s1 and lW1(t1) = l2(ts). Since
(M1 , s1) omits the set ts (x), t1 /∈ S1. So, t1 /∈ min‖‖W1) for any formula . Consequently, by Lemma 4.8, there
exists a state t2 ∈ SW1 such that:
(1) t2 ≺W1 t1.
(2) lW1(t2) = lW1(t1).
Since the relation ≺W1 is transitive, we obtain t2 ≺W1 s1, further, (W1 , s1)ts [t2] comes from lW1(t2) = lW1(t1).
Similarly, t2 /∈ min(‖‖W1) for any formula, and there exists a state t3 ∈ SW1 such that t3 ≺W1 t2 and lW1(t2) = lW1(t3).
Iterating this process, we obtain an inﬁnite decreasing chain:
. . . ≺W1 ti+1 ≺W1 ti ≺W1 . . . ≺W1 t3 ≺W1 t2 ≺W1 t1 (i < 0).
Hence, a contradiction follows from the well-foundedness of W1. Therefore, (W1 , s1) omits ts (x), as desired.
Further, since W1 is 0-saturated, for some ﬁnite subset 0 ⊆ ts (x), (W1 , s1) omits 0. From the above claim,
0 ∩ l2(ts )(x) = ∅. We set
s =
( ∨
P(x)∈0
¬p
)
∨
( ∨
¬P(x)∈0
p
)
Clearly, l2(ts)¬s and, for any t1 ≺1 s1, we have l1(t1) s , otherwise, by Claim 1, 0 can be realized by some
state t ∈ S1 such that t ≺1 s1 in (W1 , s1).
Claim 3. Let ={ ∨ ¬s : s ∈ (m)} ∪ {}. For any nonempty ﬁnite subset 0 ⊆, we have m∈ lW2
(min(‖∨0‖W2)).
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Clearly, since m , we have
m
∨
0.
For any t1 ≺1 s1, from s1 ∈ min(‖‖M1), we have l1(t1)¬. Further, since l1(t1) s for each s ∈ (m), we have
l1(t1)¬(∨0). Consequently, s1 ∈ min(‖∨0‖M1). Hence, m ∈ l1(min(‖∨0‖M1)). Since
CW2
(∨
0
) ⊆ CW1 (∨0) and mCW1 (∨0) ,
we get mCW2
(∨
0
)
. Moreover, since W2 is 0-saturated, by Lemma 4.4, we obtain m ∈ lW2(min(‖
∨
0‖W2)).
Claim 4. There exists a state s∗ ∈ S2 such that s∗ ∈ ⋂∈ min(‖‖M2) and l2(s∗) = m.
From the above claim and Lemma 4.5, since W2 is 0-saturated, there exists a state s∗ ∈ W2 such that lW2(s∗) = m
and s∗ ∈ ⋂∈ min(‖‖W2). Further, since M2 = par(W2), we have s∗ ∈ ⋂∈ min(‖‖M2) and l2(s∗) = m.
Nowwe can get a contradiction as desired. Since  ∈ , we have s∗ ∈ (m). However, by the assumption, there exists
a state ts∗ ∈ S2 such that ts∗ ≺2 s∗, moreover, by Claim 2, we obtain l2(ts∗) ∨ ¬s∗ . Consequently, a contradiction
follows from s∗ ∈ min(‖ ∨ ¬s∗‖M2). 
Corollary 4.10. Let Wi be a preferential model and Wi be 0-saturated, for i = 1, 2. If both W1 and W2 are wellfounded, then
W1 ≡ W2 implies par(W1)↔B par(W2).
Proof. Immediately follows from Lemma 4.9. 
Remark. From the proofs of Lemmas 4.8 and 4.9, it is easy to see that we only need 2-saturation for these proofs to
go through.
We now turn our attention to the existence of 0-saturated preferential models. Before this issue is addressed, we
recall some basic concepts and results from ﬁrst-order model theory [7].
Let I be a nonempty set and  a cardinal number, and let f, g be functions on the set S() of all ﬁnite subsets of 
into the set S(I) of all subsets of I. We say that gf iff for all s ∈ S(), g(s) ⊆ f (s). The function f is said to be
monotonic iff s, v ∈ S() and s ⊆ v implies f (v) ⊆ f (s), and f is said to be additive iff f (s ∪ v) = f (s)∩ f (v) for
any s, v ∈ S().
Let  be an inﬁnite cardinal. An ultraﬁlter D over I is said to be -good iff it satisﬁes the following condition: for
every cardinal  <  and every monotonic function f on S() into D, there exists an additive function g on S() into
D such that gf . An ultraﬁlter D is said to be countably incomplete if there exists a countable set E ⊆ D such that
∩E /∈ D.
Theorem 4.11. For any preferential model M for any language , there exists a preferential model M∗ such that
(1) M ≡ M∗, and
(2) The model M∗ is 0-saturated.
Proof. Let I be any set of power  such that 0 + || < . Then, there exists an +-good countably incomplete
ultraﬁlter D over I, 4 where + is the least cardinal greater than . From  < +, D is -good. Hence, the ultrapower
	D M is -saturated. 5 Since
00 + || < ,
	D M is also 0-saturated. On the other hand, by Theorem 3.5, 	D M is a preferential model such that
	D M ≡ M . 
4 Refer to Theorem 6.1.4 in [7].
5 Refer to Theorem 6.1.8 in [7].
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However, in order to show a restricted converse to Theorem 4.2, we expect that M∗ is well founded. But, an
ultraproduct 	D M can not insure this even if M is well founded. 6 Thus, we introduce the following notion.
Deﬁnition 4.7. A preferential model M is said to be of ﬁnite depth if and only if there exists a natural number n such
that the length of any chain contained in M is smaller than n.
Lemma 4.12. Let M be a preferential model of ﬁnite depth. Then, 	D M is well founded for any ultraﬁlter D.
Proof. Suppose that the length of any chain contained in M is smaller than n and	D M contains the following inﬁnite
decreasing chain:
. . . ≺D f i+1D ≺D f iD ≺D . . . ≺D f 2D ≺D f 1D (i < 0).
So, for any i < 0, {j : f i+1(j) ≺M f i(j)} ∈ D. 7 So, we have
∅ = ⋂
i<n+1
{j : f i+1(j) ≺M f i(j)} ∈ D.
Let k ∈ ⋂i<n+1 {j : f i+1(j) ≺M f i(j)}. Then, the model M contains a chain with the length n + 1 as follows:
f n+1(k) ≺M f n(k) ≺M . . . ≺M f 2(k) ≺M f 1(k).
Thus, a contradiction raises, as desired. 
Theorem 4.13. Let M1 and M2 be two preferential models, and let M1 be of ﬁnite depth. Then
|∼M2 ⊆ |∼M1 if and only if par
(
	
D
M2
)
→B par
(
	
D
M1
)
for some ultraﬁlter D.
Proof. (⇐) By Lemma 4.1, we have |∼par(	D M2) ⊆ |∼par(	D M1), further, |∼M2 ⊆ |∼M1 comes from par(	D M1)≡ M1 and par(	D M2) ≡ M2.
(⇒) Similar to Theorem 4.11, for some ultraﬁlter D, both 	D M1 and 	D M2 are 0-saturated. Further, by
Theorem 3.5, |∼	D M2 ⊆ |∼	D M1 comes from |∼M2 ⊆ |∼M1 . Hence, by Lemma 4.9 and 4.12, par(	D M2) →B
par(	D M1). 
Corollary 4.14. Let M1 and M2 be two preferential models of ﬁnite depth. Then
M1 ≡ M2 if and only if par
(
	
D
M1
)
↔B par
(
	
D
M2
)
for some ultraﬁlter D.
Proof. Follows from Theorem 4.13. 
Obviously, for any preferential models M1 and M2 such that both par(M1) and par(M2) have ﬁnite depth, M1 ≡ M2
if and only if par(	D par(M1))↔B par(	D par(M2)) for some ultraﬁlter D. By the way,	D par(M) is isomorphism
to par(	D M) for any ﬁnite model M. In the rest of this section, we will show that the above theorem may be expressed
in a more succinct form.
6 In fact, the well-foundness of M does not always imply the well-foundness of 	D M , however, this implication holds if D is 1-complete, i.e.,
for any E ⊆ D of power |E| < 1, we have ∩E ∈ D.
7 Refer to the deﬁnition of the reduced product (see, for example, 4.1.6 in [7]).
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Lemma 4.15. LetM = 〈S, l,≺〉 be a well-founded preferential model and M be0-saturated, and let s ∈ S. Suppose
that s /∈ min(‖‖) for any formula . Then there exists a state t ∈ S such that:
(1) t ≺ s.
(2) l(t) = l(s).
(3) t ∈ min(‖‖) for some formula .
Proof. Otherwise, by Lemma 4.8, there exists an inﬁnite decreasing chain s = s0  s1  s2  . . . si  . . . such that
l(si) = l(s) for any i < 0, which contradicts the well-foundedness of M. 
Hence, for any preferential model M, if M is well-founded and M is0-saturated, then M is valuation parsimonious
[18], that is, for any m ∈ lM(SM), there exists a formula  such that m ∈ lM(min(‖‖)).
Lemma 4.16. Let M be a well-founded preferential model and M be 0-saturated. Then, M ↔B par(M).
Proof. It is enough to show the following claims.
Claim 1. par(M)→BM .
Let s ∈ SM . If s ∈ min(‖‖M) for some formula , then s ∈ Spar(M) and lM(s) = lpar(M)(s). Further, since
s⇓par(M) ⊆ s⇓M , we have s⇓M>s⇓par(M). Now, we consider another case in which s /∈ min(‖‖M) for any formula .
By Lemma 4.15, there exists a state t ∈ SM such that t ≺M s, l(t) = l(s) and t ∈ min(‖‖M) for some formula .
Clearly, t ∈ Spar(M) and lM(s) = lpar(M)(t), and s⇓M>t⇓par(M) comes from t⇓par(M) ⊆ s⇓M .
Claim 2. M→Bpar(M).
Let t ∈ Spar(M). Clearly, t ∈ SM and lM(t) = lpar(M)(t). Thus, it is enough to show t⇓par(M)>t⇓M . Let s ∈ SM
such that s ≺M t . If s ∈ min(‖‖M) for some formula  then s ∈ Spar(M), lM(s) = lpar(M)(s) and s ≺par(M) t . If
s /∈ min(‖‖M) for any formula , then, by Lemma 4.15, there exists a state k ∈ SM such that k ≺M s, l(k) = l(s) and
k ∈ min(‖‖M) for some formula . Hence, k ∈ Spar(M), lM(s) = lpar(M)(k) and k ≺par(M) t . 
Since ↔B is transitive, we have the following result:
Theorem 4.17. Let M1 and M2 be two preferential models of ﬁnite depth. Then the following are equivalent:
(1) M1 ≡ M2.
(2) par(	D M1)↔B par (	D M2) for some ultraﬁlter D.
(3) 	D M1 ↔B 	D M2 for some ultraﬁlter D.
Proof. (1)⇔(2) Follows from Corollary 4.14.
(3)⇒(1) Comes from Theorems 3.5 and 4.2.
(1)⇒(3) By Corollary 4.14, for some ultraﬁlter D, par(	D M1)↔B par(	D M2) and both	D M1 and	D M2 are
0-saturated. Further, by Lemma 4.16 and 4.12, 	D Mi ↔B par(	D Mi) for i = 1, 2. So, by the transitivity of ↔B ,
we have 	D M1 ↔B 	D M2. 
Similarly, due to the transitivity of →B , we have
Theorem 4.18. Let M1 and M2 be two preferential models, and let M1 be of ﬁnite depth. Then the following are
equivalent:
(1) |∼M2 ⊆ |∼M1 .
(2) par(	D M2) →B par(	D M1) for some ultraﬁlter D.
(3) 	D M2 →B 	D M1 for some ultraﬁlter D.
Corollary 4.19. Let both M1 and M2 be two ﬁnite preferential models. Then
(1) M1 ≡ M2 if and only if M1↔BM2.
(2) |∼M2 ⊆ |∼M1 if and only if M2→BM1
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Proof. For i = 1, 2, since Mi is ﬁnite, Mi is isomorphism to 	D M2 for any ultraﬁlter D. 
5. M-Similarity between preferential models
In the last section, we explore the notion of B-similarity. A limitation of Theorem 4.17 lies in that it is applicable
only for preferential models of ﬁnite depth. To supply this gap, this section will introduce a weak notion of similarity
called M-similarity and explore the relationship between M-similarity and equivalence of preferential models. For
any preferential models, we will establish a similar result as Theorem 4.17 in terms of M-similarity. Moreover, as its
application, the expressive power of Boolean combinations of conditional assertions will be investigated.
5.1. M-Similarity and equivalence
Given a preferential model M = 〈S, l,≺〉, we will denote the set {s ∈ S : s ∈ min(‖‖) for some formula } by
MF(M).
Deﬁnition 5.1. For any two preferential models M1 = 〈S1, l1,≺1〉 and M2 = 〈S2, l2,≺2〉 for the same language, M1
will be said to be semi-M-similar to M2 (notation: M1 → M2) if
∀s2 ∈ MF(M2)∃s1 ∈ S1(l1(s1) = l2(s2) ∧ s2⇓M2>s1⇓M1 ).
Proposition 5.1. Let M1 and M2 be two preferential models. Then
(1) M1→BM2 implies M1→M2.
(2) par(M1)→B par (M2) iff par (M1)→ par (M2).
Proof. Straightforward. 
Proposition 5.2. Let M1 and M2 be preferential models, and let s2 ∈ MF(M2) and s1 ∈ S1. Then
l1(s1) = l2(s2) ∧ s2⇓M2>s1⇓M1 implies s1 ∈ MF(M1).
Proof. Since s2 ∈ MF(M2), we may suppose that s2 ∈ min(‖‖M2) for some formula . So, l1(s1)  comes from
l1(s1) = l2(s2). Similar to Lemma 4.1, we can show that s1 ∈ min(‖‖M1). Hence, s1 ∈ MF(M1), as desired. 
Thus, M1→M2 may be equivalently deﬁned as
∀s2 ∈ MF(M2)∃s1 ∈ MF(M1)(l1(s1) = l2(s2) ∧ s2⇓M2>s1⇓M1 ).
Applying the deﬁnition of → in the above fashion, it is easy to show that the relation → is transitive.
By theway, since the setMF(M) is the domain ofpar(M), it is possible for someone to raise the following conjectures:
Conjecture 5.1. M1→M2 implies par(M1)→ par(M2).
Conjecture 5.2. par(M1)→ par(M2) implies M1→M2.
Conjecture 5.3. l1(min(‖‖M1)) ⊇ l2(min(‖‖M2)) for any  implies M1 → M2.
The following example provides negative answers for the above conjectures.
Example 5.1. Let  be an inﬁnite language. Consider injective rankedmodelsW1,W2 andW3 with the graphical shape
in Fig. 2, where m is a valuation such that mp,U = {v ∈ Val() : v ¬p} and n ∈ U . It is easy to see that W1→W3.
However, due to the inﬁniteness of the language , n /∈ par(W3), thus, par(W1) par(W3) comes from
m ∈ par(W3) and n ≺par(W1) m.
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Fig. 2. Preferential model W1,W2 and W3.
On the other hand, par(W3)→ par(W2) and, for any , we have
l2(min(‖‖W2)) = l3(min(‖‖W3)).
But, since n ≺3 m and n ≺2 m, we obtain W3W2. 
However, for ﬁnite preferential models, Conjectures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 hold. More generally, we have
Proposition 5.3. Let Mi be a well-founded preferential model and Mi be 0-saturated for i = 1, 2. Then,
M1→M2 if and only if par(M1)→ par(M2).
In particular, for any ﬁnite preferential models M1 and M2,M1→M2 if and only if par(M1)→ par(M2).
Proof. (⇒) Suppose thatM1→M2. By Claim 1 from Lemma 4.16 and (1) from Proposition 5.1, we get par(M1)→M1,
further, due to the transitivity of →, we have
par(M1)→M2.
On the other hand, by Claim 2 from Lemma 4.16 and (1) from Proposition 5.1, we obtain
M2→ par(M2).
Hence, par(M1)→ par(M2) comes from the transitivity of →.
(⇐) Suppose that par(M1)→ par(M2). First, by (2) from Proposition 5.1, par(M1)→Bpar(M2). Next, by Claims
1 and 2 from Lemma 4.16, we have
M1→Bpar(M1) and par(M2)→BM2.
So, M1→BM2 comes from the transitivity of →B . Thus, by (1) from Proposition 5.1, we obtain M1→M2, as
desired. 
Proposition 5.4. Let Mi be a well-founded preferential model and Mi be 0-saturated for i = 1, 2. Then,
M1→M2 if and only if M1→BM2.
In particular, for any ﬁnite preferential models M1 and M2,M1→M2 if and only if M1→BM2.
Proof. By Proposition 5.3 and (2) from Proposition 5.1, it is easy to see that
M1→M2 if and only if par(M1)→Bpar (M2).
Further, by Claims 1 and 2 from Lemma 4.16 and the transitivity of →B , we have
M1→BM2 if and only if par(M1)→Bpar(M2).
Consequently, M1→M2 if and only if M1→BM2, as desired. 
Z. Zhu / Theoretical Computer Science 353 (2006) 26–52 43
Furthermore, from the above proposition and Corollary 4.19, it is easy to see that Conjecture 5.3 holds for ﬁnite
preferential models. Now, we turn to issue concerning the relationship between the equivalence and M-similarity.
Lemma 5.5. M2→M1 implies |∼M2 ⊆ |∼M1 .
Proof. Similar to Lemma 4.1. 
Deﬁnition 5.2. Let M1 and M2 be two preferential models for the same language. M1 and M2 will be said to be
M-similar (notation: M1↔M2) if M1→M2 and M2→M1.
Obviously, the relation ↔ is an equivalence relation.
Theorem 5.6. M1↔M2 implies M1 ≡ M2.
Proof. Immediately follows from Lemma 5.5 and Deﬁnition 5.2. 
Similar to B-similarity, two equivalent preferential models do not need to be M-similar. For instance, consider W2
and W3 in Example 5.1. Since W2 = par(W3), we have W2 ≡ W3, but W2 ↔W3. The rest of this subsection will
concern itself with showing a restricted converse to the above theorem.
Lemma 5.7. Let M1 = 〈S1, l1,≺1〉 and M2 = 〈S2, l2,≺2〉 be two preferential models for a language , and let both
M1 and M2 be 0-saturated. Then, |∼M2 ⊆ |∼M1 implies M2→M1.
Proof. Similar to Lemma 4.9. But, for the integrality, we give the proof here. Let s1 ∈ MF(M1) and l1(s1) = m. It is
enough to show that there exists a state s2 ∈ S2 such that
(1) l2(s2) = m.
(2) ∀t2 ∈ S2(t2 ≺2 s2 ⇒ ∃t1 ∈ S1(t1 ≺1 s1 ∧ l1(t1) = l2(t2)).
Since s1 ∈ MF(M1), we have s1 ∈ min(‖‖M1) for some formula . We put
(m) = {s ∈ S2 : s ∈ min(‖‖M2) and l2(s) = m}.
Similar to Lemma 4.9, (m) = ∅. We will prove that there is a state s2 ∈ (m) satisfying condition (2). Suppose
not. Hence, for every s ∈ (m), there exists a state t ∈ S2 satisfying the following conditions:
(3) t ≺2 s, and
(4) ∀t1 ∈ S1(t1 ≺1 s1 ⇒ l1(t1) = l2(t)).
So, for every s ∈ (m), we can choose a state ts ∈ S2 satisfying the above conditions (3) and (4). To complete the
proof, we need to demonstrate the following claims.
Claim 1. There exists a state t1 ∈ S1 such that t1 ≺1 s1.
Similar to Claim 1 in Lemma 4.9.
Claim 2. For any s ∈ (m), there exists a formula s such that l2(ts)¬s and, for any t1 ≺1 s1, l1(t1) s .
Let cs1 be a new constant symbol interpreted by s1 in (M1 , s1), and let
ts (x) = l2(ts )(x) ∪ {R(x, cs1)}.
Since l1(t) = l2(ts) for any t ≺1 s1, the model (M1 , s1) omits the set ts (x). Further, since M1 is 0-saturated,
there exists a ﬁnite subset 0 ⊆ ts (x) omitted by (M1 , s1). By Claim 1, it is easy to see that 0 ∩ l2(ts )(x) = ∅.
We set
s =
( ∨
P(x)∈0
¬p
)
∨
( ∨
¬P(x)∈0
p
)
.
Clearly, l2(ts)¬s . On the other hand, for any t1 ≺1 s1, we have l1(t1) s , otherwise, by Claim 1, 0 can be
realized by some state t ∈ S1 such that t ≺1 s1.
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Claim 3. Let  = { ∨ ¬s : s ∈ (m)} ∪ {}. For any nonempty ﬁnite subset 0 ⊆ , we have m ∈
l2(min(‖∨0‖M2)).
Since m , we have m
∨
0. For any t1 ≺1 s1 and s ∈ (m), from l1(t1) s and s1 ∈ min(‖‖M1), we
have l1(t1)¬(∨0). Consequently, s1 ∈ min(‖∨0‖M1). Hence, m ∈ l1(min(‖∨0‖M1)) and mCM1(∨0).
Since CM2(
∨
0) ⊆ CM1(
∨
0), we have mCM2(
∨
0). Further, since M2 is 0-saturated, by Lemma 4.4,
m ∈ l2(min(‖∨0‖M2)).
Now, a contradiction is raised. By Claim 3 and Lemma 4.5, since M2 is 0-saturated, we have
s∗ ∈ ⋂
∈
min(‖‖M2) and l2(s∗) = m for some state s∗ ∈ S2.
Further, s∗ ∈ (m) follows from  ∈ . However, by the assumption andClaim 2, we get ts∗ ≺2 s∗ and l2(ts∗)¬s∗
for some state ts∗ ∈ S2. Thus, it follows that s∗ /∈ min(‖ ∨ ¬s∗‖M2), a contradiction, as desired. 
Corollary 5.8. Let M1 and M2 be two preferential models, and let both M1 and M2 be 0-saturated. Then
M1 ≡ M2 implies M1↔M2.
Proof. Immediately follows from Lemma 5.7. 
Now, we arrive at the main result of this section which plays a similar role as Keisler–Shelah’s Isomorphism
Theorem [7] and Hennessy–Milner Theorem [2] in ﬁrst-order logic and modal logic, respectively.
Theorem 5.9. For any preferential models M1 and M2, we have
(1) |∼M2 ⊆ |∼M1 iff 	D M2→	D M1 for some ultraﬁlter D.
(2) M1 ≡ M2 iff 	D M1↔	D M2 for some ultraﬁlter D.
In particular, if both M1 and M2 are ﬁnite, then
(3) |∼M2 ⊆ |∼M1 iff M2→M1.
(4) M1 ≡ M2 iff M1↔M2.
Proof. Similar to Theorem 4.11, there exists an ultraﬁlter D such that 	D M2 and 	D M1 are 0-saturated. Then,
(1) and (2) come from Theorem 3.5, 5.6, Lemma 5.5, 5.7 and Corollary 5.8. Conclusions (3) and (4) follow from
Corollary 4.19 and Proposition 5.4. 
5.2. Expressive power of Boolean combinations of conditional assertions
From theﬁrst-order translation deﬁned in Section 3,we know that conditional assertionsmaybe regarded as fragments
of ﬁrst-order languages. This subsection will explore the characterization for ﬁrst-order sentences which are equivalent
to some translations of conditional assertions in terms of M-similarity. More formally, we will show that a ﬁrst-order
sentence is equivalent to a Boolean combination of the translations of conditional assertions if and only if it is preserved
under ↔.
Deﬁnition 5.3. Given a propositional language ,BCA() is the least set satisfying the following conditions:
(1) BCA() is a set of sentences of ﬁrst-order language .
(2) For any ,  ∈ Form(), (|∼)◦ ∈ BCA().
(3) If 
 ∈ BCA() then ¬
 ∈ BCA().
(4) If 
1, 
2 ∈ BCA() then 
1 ∧ 
2, 
1 ∨ 
2 ∈ BCA().
Any sentence in BCA() is said to be a boolean combination of conditional assertions. On the other hand, we use
PBCA() to denote the least set satisfying the above conditions (1), (2) and (4), and sentences in PBCA() are called
positive boolean combinations of conditional assertions.
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Lemma 5.10. Boolean combinations of conditional assertions are preserved under ↔. That is, for any preferential
models M1 and M2, if M1↔M2 then
M1  
 iff M2  
 for any 
 ∈ BCA().
Proof. Proceeding by induction on the complexity of 
. It is easy to carry out for 
 with the format ¬
1, 
1 ∨ 
2 and

1 ∧ 
2, where 
1, 
2 ∈ BCA(). In the case where 
 = (|∼)◦ for some formula ,  ∈ Form(), this is done by
observing that the following are equivalent:
M1  (|∼)◦
iff |∼M1 (By Lemma 3.3)
iff |∼M2 (By M1↔M2 and Theorem 5.6)
iff M2  (|∼)◦ (By Lemma 3.3). 
Lemma 5.11. Positive boolean combinations of conditional assertions are preserved under →. That is, for any pref-
erential models M1 and M2, if M1→M2 then
M1  
 implies M2  
 for any 
 ∈ PBCA().
Proof. By Lemma 5.5 and proceeding by induction on 
, omitted. 
Given a propositional language , let  be a ﬁrst-order sentence of the language . The formula  will be said to be
P -equivalent to a (positive) boolean combination of conditional assertions if and only if, for some formula  ∈ BCA()
(resp.,  ∈ PBCA()), we have
M   iff M   for any preferential model M for . (5.1)
It is easy to see that the above condition (5.1) is equivalent to
{pos} ∪ {smooth() :  ∈ Form()}  ↔ ,
where
pos =def ∀x¬R(x, x) ∧ ∀x∀y∀z(R(x, y) ∧ R(y, z) → R(x, z)).
As a matter of convenience, we put
P () =def {pos} ∪ {smooth() :  ∈ Form()}.
If there is no ambiguity, we shall write P for P (). Clearly, the P-equivalence is exactly the -equivalence 8 in
ﬁrst-order logic if we set  = P .
Theorem 5.12. Let  be a propositional language and  be a ﬁrst-order sentence of the language . Then,  is
P-equivalent to a boolean combination of conditional assertions iff  is preserved under ↔.
Proof. (⇒) Immediately follows from Lemma 5.10.
(⇐) Suppose that  is preserved under ↔. We put
BCA() = { :  ∈ BCA() such that P   → }.
Let M be any preferential model for  such that M BCA(). We will show M  . To this end, two claims are
demonstrated as follows.
Claim 1. There exists a preferential model W such that W  (|∼M)◦ ∪ {}.
8 In ﬁrst-order logic, two formulas  and  are said to be -equivalent iff  ↔ .
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Suppose not. So, we have
(|∼M)◦ ∪ P ¬.
By the compactness, there exists a ﬁnite subset  ⊆ (|∼M)◦ such that
P   → ¬∧.
Clearly, ¬∧ ∈ BCA(), hence, ¬∧ ∈ BCA(), which contradicts M BCA() and M .
Claim 2. M  .
By the above claim, we may suppose W  (|∼M)◦ ∪ {} for some preferential model W . So, by Corollary 3.4,
W ≡ M . By Theorem 5.9,	D M↔	D W for some ultraﬁlter D. From W   and W  	D W , we have	D W  .
Further, since  is preserved under ↔, we have 	D M  . Consequently, M   comes from M  	D M .
Returning now to the proof of the theorem. By Claim 2, for any preferential model M for , M BCA() implies
M  . So, by the compactness, there exists a ﬁnite subset  ⊆ BCA() such that
P ∪  .
On the other hand, we have
P ∪ {}.
Hence, P   ↔ ∧ and∧ ∈ BCA(), as desired. 
Theorem 5.13. Let  be a propositional language and  be a ﬁrst-order sentence of the language . Then,  is
P-equivalent to a positive boolean combination of conditional assertions iff  is preserved under →.
Proof. (⇒) Comes from Lemma 5.11.
(⇐) Assume that  is preserved under →. We set
PBCA() = { :  ∈ PBCA() such that P   → }.
Firstly, we will show that M   for any preferential model M such that M PBCA(). Let M be any model
satisfying M PBCA(). The following two claims are proved in turn.
Claim 1. Let  = {¬(|∼
)◦ : | /∼M
 and , 
 ∈ Form()}. Then, W  ∪ {} for some preferential model W .
Suppose not. Hence, ∪P ¬. It then follows from the compactness that, for some ﬁnite subset  ⊆ , we have
P ∪ {}¬∧.
Clearly, there exists a formula  ∈ PBCA() such that ¬∧ ↔ . Thus, we obtain
P   → .
So,  ∈ PBCA(). Further, a contradiction comes from M PBCA(), M  and 
∧
 ↔ ¬.
Claim 2. M  .
By Claim 1, there exists a preferential model W such that W ∪{}. Thus,	D W   comes from W   and W
 	D W . For any , 
 ∈ Form(), since W , | /∼M
 implies | /∼W
. So, |∼W ⊆ |∼M . Hence, by Theorem 5.9,
we get 	D W →	D M for some ultraﬁlter D. Because 	D W   and  is preserved under →, we obtain 	D M  .
So, M   follows from M  	D M .
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Consequently, for each preferential model M such that M PBCA(), we have M  . So,
P ∪ PBCA() .
It follows from the compactness thatP ∪  for some ﬁnite subset ⊆ PBCA(). Moreover, from ⊆ PBCA(),
we have
P ∪ {}.
Thus, P   ↔ ∧, as desired. 
In model theory, a class K of models for  is said to be an elementary class if, for some set  of sentences of , K is
deﬁned by , that is, K is exactly the class of all models of . There exists a well known theorem so-called Elementary
Class Theorem 9 which provides a characterization for elementary classes. Clearly, given a preferential relation |∼ in
, the class of all preferential models for |∼ is an elementary class because it can be deﬁned by the setP ∪|∼◦. Thus, a
natural problem raises at this point, namely how to characterize this kind of elementary classes? More generally, how to
characterize elementary classes of preferential models deﬁned by sentences in BCA() or PBCA()? Since conditional
assertions are just fragments of ﬁrst-order languages, Elementary Class Theorem does not provide answers to these
questions directly. In the following, we address this issue. We ﬁrstly recall a basic theorem from model theory, which
is an ultraproduct version of the compactness theorem.
Theorem 5.14. Let  be a set of ﬁrst-order sentences. Let I() be the set of all ﬁnite subsets of , and for each
i ∈ I(), let i be a model of i. Then there exists an ultraﬁlter D over I() such that the ultraproduct 	D i is a
model of .
Proof. See Corollary 4.1.11 in [7]. 
Let K be a nonempty class of preferential models for a language . K is said to be closed under ↔ if, for any models
M1 and M2, M1 ↔ M2 and M1 ∈ K implies M2 ∈ K . Similarly, K is said to be closed under → if, for any models
M1 and M2, M1 → M2 and M1 ∈ K implies M2 ∈ K . K is said to be closed under ultraproducts if every ultraproduct
	D Mi of a family of models Mi ∈ K belongs to K. K is said to be closed under ultrapowers if M ∈ K implies the
ultrapower 	D Mi ∈ K for any ultraﬁlter D. In the following, we use K to denote the complement of K within the
class of all preferential models for .
K is said to be deﬁned by (positive) boolean combinations of conditional assertions if there exists a set  ⊆ BCA()
( ⊆ PBCA(), respectively) such that, for any preferential model W for , W  if and only if W ∈ K , that is, the
class {M : M ∈ K} is an elementary class deﬁned by P ∪ . Moreover, if such set  is ﬁnite, then, K is said to be
ﬁnitely deﬁned by boolean combinations of conditional assertions.
Theorem 5.15. Let K be a nonempty class of preferentialmodels for a language .K is deﬁned by boolean combinations
of conditional assertions if and only if
(1) K is closed under ↔.
(2) K is closed under ultraproducts.
(3) K is closed under ultrapowers.
Proof. (⇒) Straightforward.
(⇐) We put
 = {
 ∈ BCA() : 
 holds in all M such that M ∈ K}.
Let M be a preferential model for  such that M . It is enough to show that M ∈ K . Let i be any ﬁnite
nonempty subset of (|∼M)◦. We will show that there exists a model Wi ∈ K such that Wi  i. Suppose not. Then, for
any W ∈ K , W ¬
∧

∈i 
. Clearly, ¬
∧

∈i 
 ∈ BCA(), so, ¬
∧

∈i 
 ∈ , which contradicts M  and M  i.
Consequently, by Theorem 5.14, there exists an ultraﬁlter D such that 	D Wi  (|∼M)◦. So, 	D Wi ≡ M , moreover,
9 See Theorem 4.1.12 and Corollary 6.1.16 in [7].
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by (2), 	D Wi ∈ K . On the other hand, by Theorem 5.9, 	D∗(	D Wi) ↔	D∗ M for some ultraﬁlter D∗. Since K is
closed under ultraproducts, we have 	D∗ (	D Wi) ∈ K . Further, 	D∗ M ∈ K follows from (1). Since K is closed
under ultrapowers, we obtain M ∈ K , as desired. 
Corollary 5.16. Let K be a nonempty class of preferential models for a language . K is ﬁnitely deﬁned by boolean
combinations of conditional assertions if and only if
(1) K is closed under ↔.
(2) K is closed under ultraproducts.
(3) K is closed under ultraproducts.
Proof. (⇐) Since K is closed under ↔, so is K . Hence, by Theorem 5.15, both K and K are deﬁned by boolean
combinations of conditional assertions. Let K and K be deﬁned by 1 and 2 respectively. So, 1 ∪ 2 ∪ P is
inconsistent. By the compactness, for some ﬁnite set 1 ⊆ 1 and 2 ⊆ 2, 1 ∪ 2 ∪ P is inconsistent. It is easy
to see that K and K is deﬁned by 1 and 2, respectively.
(⇒) Let K be deﬁned by ﬁnite set  ⊆ BCA(). Thus, (1) and (2) follows from Theorem 5.15. Since  is a ﬁnite
subset of BCA(), ¬(∧) ∈ BCA(). Clearly, K is deﬁned by ¬(∧). So, by Theorem 5.15, K is closed under
ultraproducts. 
Theorem 5.17. Let K be a nonempty class of preferential models for a language . K is deﬁned by positive boolean
combinations of conditional assertions if and only if
(1) K is closed under →.
(2) K is closed under ultraproducts.
(3) K is closed under ultrapowers.
Proof. (⇒) Straightforward.
(⇐) Let
 = {
 ∈ PBCA() : 
 holds in all M such that M ∈ K}.
Suppose that M is a preferential model for  such that M . It is sufﬁcient to show that M ∈ K . We put
 = {¬(|∼)◦ : | /∼M and ,  ∈ Form()}.
Let i be any ﬁnite nonempty subset of . We will prove that there exists a model Wi ∈ K such that Wi  i. Suppose
not. Then, for any W ∈ K , W ¬
∧

∈i 
. Clearly,
¬∧
∈i 
 ↔  for some formula  ∈ PBCA().
So,  ∈ , which contradicts M  and M  i. Consequently, by Theorem 5.14, there exists an ultraﬁlter D such
that 	D Wi . Hence, |∼	D Wi ⊆ |∼M . Further, by Theorem 5.9, 	D∗(	D Wi)→	D∗ M for some ultraﬁlter D∗.
Due to (2), we have 	D∗(	D Wi) ∈ K . Thus, 	D∗ M ∈ K comes from the closeness of K under →. By (3), we have
M ∈ K , as desired. 
Corollary 5.18. Let K be a nonempty class of preferential models for a language . K is ﬁnitely deﬁned by positive
boolean combinations of conditional assertions if and only if
(1) K is closed under →.
(2) K is closed under ultraproducts.
(3) K is closed under ↔.
(4) K is closed under ultraproducts.
Proof. (⇒) Let K be deﬁned by ﬁnite set  ⊆ PBCA(). Thus, (1) and (2) follows from Theorem 5.17. Since  is a
ﬁnite subset of PBCA(), ¬(∧) ∈ BCA(). It is easy to see that K is deﬁned by ¬(∧). So, by Theorem 5.15, K
is closed under ultraproducts and ↔.
(⇐) Similar to Corollary 5.16. 
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Given a class K of preferential models for a language , K is said to be deﬁned by a preferential relation |∼ if, for
any preferential model M, M ∈ K if and only if |∼M = |∼. Then, we have the following result:
Theorem 5.19. Let K be a nonempty class of preferential models for a language . K is deﬁned by a preferential
relation if and only if
(1) For any M1, M2 ∈ K , there exists an ultraﬁlter D such that 	D M1 ↔	D M2.
(2) K is closed under ↔.
(3) K is closed under ultrapowers.
(4) K is closed under ultrapowers.
Proof. (⇒) Easy.
(⇐) Since M ≡ 	D M for any preferential model M and ultraﬁlter D, by (1) and Theorem 5.6, we have M1 ≡ M2
for any M1, M2 ∈ K . Hence, we may suppose that |∼M = |∼ for any M ∈ K . Let W be a preferential model such
that |∼ = |∼W . Thus, W ≡ M for some (equivalently, every) model M ∈ K . So, by Theorem 5.9, 	D W ↔	D M
for some ultraﬁlter D. By (2) and (3), we have 	D W ∈ K , further, W ∈ K follows from (4). 
6. Some model-theoretic results about preferential models
Since ﬁrst-order translation provides an approach of using results and methods from ﬁrst-order model theory, it is a
powerful tool of exploring properties of preferential models and preferential inferences. To illustrate this, we will give
some model-theoretic results about preferential models. These results immediately follow from ﬁrst-order translation
and ﬁrst-order model theory, however, it seems to me that it is nontrivial to show them without the help of ﬁrst-order
model theory.
In the following, for convenience, the pair 〈S,≺〉 is called a poset if the binary relation ≺ over S is transitive and
irreﬂexive. Let  be a class of posets, a preferential model 〈S, l,≺〉 is said to be from  if the poset 〈S,≺〉 belongs to
. We use () to denote the class of all preferential models for  coming from .
Deﬁnition 6.1 (Zhu et al. [19]). Let |∼ be an inference relation in  and 0 a sublanguage of , the reduct of |∼ with
respect to 0 is |∼ ∩ (Form(0))2 and denoted by |∼⇓0 .
Deﬁnition 6.2 (Zhu et al. [19]). Let W = 〈S, l,≺〉 be a preferential model for  and 0 a sublanguage of . The reduct
of W with respect to 0 is a triple 〈S0, l0,≺0〉 such that S0 = S, ≺0=≺, and for any s ∈ S, l0(s) is the reduction of
l(s) with respect to 0 (i.e., l0(s) = l(s) ∩ 0 ). In the following, the triple 〈S0, l0,≺0〉 will be denoted by W⇓0 .
Proposition 6.1 (Compactness). Let  be a class of posets which is closed under ultraproducts, and let |∼ be a
preferential relation in a language . If for any ﬁnite sublanguage 0 ⊆ , the reduction |∼⇓0 has models from, then
so does the relation |∼ itself.
Proof. Let  = |∼◦. We demonstrate the following claims.
Claim 1. For any i ∈ I(), we have Mi  i for some preferential model Mi from ().
Clearly, i is a set of sentences of . We put
0 =def {p : p ∈  such that corresponding relation symbol P occurs in i}.
Since i is ﬁnite, so is 0. So, there exists a preferential model M∗i = 〈S∗i , l∗i ,≺∗i 〉 from  such that |∼M∗i = |∼⇓0 .
Obviously, i ⊆ (|∼M∗i )◦. So, by Lemma 3.3, M∗i  i. Since M∗i is a model for the language 0 , in order to complete
the proof of this claim, we need an expansion of M∗i to the language . Thus, we deﬁne Mi = 〈Si, li ,≺i〉 as follows:(1) Si = S∗i .
(2) ≺i=≺∗i .
(3) For any p ∈  and s ∈ Si , p ∈ li (s) iff p ∈ 0 and p ∈ l∗i (s).
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We will prove that Mi is a preferential model for . It is enough to show Mi is smooth. Let (p1, p2, . . . , pn) be any
formula of  and p1, p2, . . . , pn be all propositional symbols occurring in  but not in 0. It is easy to see that
‖(p1, p2, . . . , pn)‖Mi = ‖(⊥,⊥, . . . ,⊥)‖M∗i ,
where (⊥, ⊥, . . . ,⊥) is the formula obtained from (p1, p2, . . . , pn) by substituting ⊥ for pi(i = 1, 2, . . . , n). Since
the set ‖(⊥, ⊥, . . . ,⊥)‖M∗i is smooth, so is ‖(p1, p2, . . . , pn)‖Mi . Hence, Mi is a preferential model for  and〈Si,≺i〉 ∈ . Obviously, Mi is an expansion of M∗i to the language  and Mi  i.
Claim 2. There exists a preferential model W from  such that |∼W = |∼.
By Claim 1 and Theorem 5.14, there exists an ultraﬁlter D over I() such that 	D Mi . Similar to Theorem
3.5, it is easy to see that 	D Mi is a preferential model such that |∼	D Mi = |∼. Further, since  is closed under
ultraproducts, 	D Mi is from . 
Let  be a property of posets deﬁnable by ﬁrst-order language, in other words, the class {〈S,≺〉: 〈S,≺〉 is a poset
satisfying } be an elementary class. Then, the above proposition implies that: for any inference relation |∼, if any
reduct of |∼ with respect to ﬁnite sublanguage may be generated by models with the property , then so does |∼ itself.
Proposition 6.2 (Existence of P-saturated model). Let be a class of posets which is closed under ultraproducts. For
any language  and preferential model M from , there exists a preferential model W such that:
(1) W comes from .
(2) M ≡ W .
(3) W is P-saturated.
Proof. Similar to Theorem 4.11. 
Thus, any preferential model M has an equivalent model which is P-saturated and has the same ﬁrst-order properties
as M.
Proposition 6.3. Let |∼ be a preferential relation in . If |∼ may be generated by some inﬁnite preferential models,
then it may be generated by inﬁnite models of any given power  ‖‖.
Proof. Let  = |∼◦ ∪ P . Since |∼ can be generated by an inﬁnite preferential model,  has inﬁnite model.
So, by Löwenheim–Skolem–Tarski Theorem 10 from ﬁrst-order model theory, for any cardinal number  ‖‖ =
‖‖, has model with size . Thus, by Corollary 3.4, |∼ may be generated by inﬁnite models of any given power
‖‖. 
We denote the class of all injective models for  by IM(). For any ﬁnite language , since there are only ﬁnitely
many injective models up to isomorphism and those injective models are ﬁnite, the class {M :  ∈ IM()} can be
characterized by a ﬁrst-order sentence of the language . However, it is false when the language is inﬁnite.
Proposition 6.4. For any inﬁnite language , the class {M :  ∈ IM()} can not be characterized by ﬁrst-order
sentences. In other words, it is not an elementary class of .
Proof. Suppose that there exists a set of ﬁrst-order sentences of such that M  iffM ∈ IM(). Since  is inﬁnite,
there exists an inﬁnite model in IM() (for instance, considering an inﬁnite antichain). Hence,  has inﬁnite models.
So, by Löwenheim–Skolem–Tarski Theorem,  has an inﬁnite model M with size  > 2||. Clearly, M /∈ IM(),
a contradiction. 
Remark. A preferential model may be regarded as a Kripke model of basic modal language which contains only
diamond !, thus it makes perfect sense to consider whether the class IM() is deﬁnable by basic modal formulas.
10 See Corollary 2.1.6 in [7].
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Since any modal formula is equivalent to some ﬁrst-order sentences when considering global truth on models [2], by
the above proposition, the class IM() is indeﬁnable by basic modal formulas for any inﬁnite language . Moreover,
even for ﬁnite language , since IM() is not closed under disjoint unions, 11 the class IM() is also undeﬁnable by
basic modal formulas.
One of the important topics in the study of nonmonotonic inference relations is establishing representation theorems
for them. A number of representation theorems have been established in the literature [1,8,10,11,15,17,18]. Suppose
that  is a set of properties of inference relations (e.g., Horn or non-Horn conditions deﬁned in the style of Gentzen)
and () is a class of preferential models for a language . A representation theorem RTH((),) usually consists
of the following two statements:
(i) If an inference relation |∼ satisﬁes all properties in  then there exists a preferential model W ∈ () such that
|∼ = |∼W .
(ii) For any preferential model W ∈ (), the relation |∼W satisﬁes all properties in .
A general rule [5] is a rule of the form
‖ − (p1, p2, . . . , pn),
where both  and  are ﬁnite sets of conditional assertions and p1, p2, . . . , pn are all propositional symbols occurring
in ‖ −. Following [5], we say that a relation |∼ in  satisﬁes the general rule ‖– (p1, p2, . . . , pn) if and only if,
for any formulas 1, 2, . . . , n of ,

{−→i−→pi
}
⊆ |∼ implies 
{−→i−→pi
}
∩ |∼ = ∅,
where 
{−→i−→pi
}
(resp., 
{−→i−→pi
}
) is a set of conditional assertions obtained from  (resp., ) by substituting i
for pi(i = 1, 2, . . . , n). Obviously, both Horn and non-Horn rules introduced in the literature [1,8,10–12] are
general rules.
Theorem 6.5. Let  be a class of posets which is closed under ultraproducts, and let  be a set of general rules. Then
the following are equivalent:
(1) RTH((),) holds for any ﬁnite language .
(2) RTH((),) holds for any language .
Proof. (1⇒2) It is enough to demonstrate the following claims.
Claim 1. For any language  and any preferential model M ∈ (), |∼M satisﬁes .
Suppose that, for some general rule ‖– (p1, p2, . . . , pn) ∈ , |∼M does not satisfy it. So, there are formulas i
(1 in) such that

{−→i−→pi
}
⊆ |∼M and 
{−→i−→pi
}
∩ |∼M = ∅.
Let 0 = ⋃1 in atm(i ), where atm(i ) is the set of all propositional symbols occurring in i . So, M⇓0 does not
satisfy the rule ‖–. Further, since 0 is ﬁnite, a contradiction comes from (1) and M⇓0 ∈ (0).
Claim 2. For any language  and preferential relation |∼ in , if |∼ satisﬁes  then there exists a model M ∈ ()
such that |∼M = |∼.
Since |∼ satisﬁes , so does the reduction |∼⇓0 for any ﬁnite sublanguage 0 ⊆ . So, by (1), for any ﬁnite
sublanguage 0 ⊆ , we have |∼⇓0 = |∼M0 for some model M0 ∈ (0). Thus, by Proposition 6.1, we obtain|∼ = |∼M for some model M ∈ (), as desired.
(2⇒1) Trivially. 
11 The deﬁnition of the disjoint unions may be found in [2].
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Consequently, given an elementary class , in order to establish the representation theorem RTH((),) for any
language , it is enough to consider only the ﬁnite language case.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we explored the notion of similarity for preferential models and characterized the equivalence of models
in terms of similarity. As application of the main theorem obtained in this paper, we investigated the expressive power
of conditional assertions and provided the characterization for the class of preferential models deﬁned by Boolean
combinations of conditional assertions.
First-order translation originating from modal logic is of basic importance in this paper, through which we can apply
results and techniques from ﬁrst-order model theory to nonmonotonic logic. Thus, we believe that ﬁrst-order translation
is a powerful tool in the study of nonmonotonic inference relations, moreover, such idea is useful for any nonclassical
logic if its semantic may be expressed in ﬁrst-order logic.
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